We publish here a translation from our comrades in Battaglia Comunista on the condition of the working class in Italy. Much of it will make for familiar reading to workers beyond Italy as well.

Introduction

The following article is an update of a previous piece published in Prometeo no. 28 in 2022.⁽¹⁾ Prime Minister Meloni's statements on the eve of May Day prompted us to "reopen the matter." Not that Meloni's self-promoting message was any different from what she's been saying for about two years: i.e. the usual shameless picture of a reality that doesn't exist, apart from the barrage of bullshit blasted from television and cell phone screens. Not only does the "Promised Land" promoted by the Prime Minister not appear on the radar of the working class, but, on the contrary, it seems further away than ever.

This article mainly refers to data from the end of March, but figures released around 1 May only confirm, if not worsen, the gloomy picture facing the proletariat. One figure, amongst many, is the tax burden on pay slips, which once again belies what the "sovereignist" government is touting as one of its greatest achievements for the working class: the supposed lowering of tax deductions (see below). The OECD itself, that "Bible" for both the capitalist right and left, says so:

In 2024, according to the OECD "Taxing Wages 2025" report, the burden of employment taxes for a single worker increased by 1.61 percentage points, reaching 47.1% of labour costs and remaining well above the OECD average (34.9%). The Italian one is the most significant increase among the OECD countries. Italy is in fourth place for the size of the wedge, that is, the difference between the cost of labour borne by the employer [entrepreneur, we say...] and the net income received by the worker.⁽²⁾

The reason for this apparent incongruity with the government's toxic propaganda is easily explained: the (meagre) contractual increases resulting from the renewal of a portion of employment contracts triggered the higher tax rate, so that what is given with one hand is taken back with the other — by the state, the supreme defender of the interests of the employers and the bourgeoisie. Not bad for a government friendly to the working class. …

Employment: Propaganda Versus Reality

On 1 April, ISTAT⁽³⁾ published an update on employment trends in Italy. The unemployment rate had fallen to 5.9% in February, the lowest since 2007, when it was 5.8%. Furthermore, there were 567,000 more people employed compared to the same month in 2024, bringing the employment rate to 63%. The only discordant note concerned the inactive population, which, with a 0.3% increase, had reached 32.9%. As is well known, "inactive people" are defined as those who, despite not having a job or studying, are no longer looking for work because they have been discouraged from doing so.

Overall, then, this appears to be yet another medal that the wonder government can pin on its chest, except that other data released a few days earlier mean the medal risks resembling an April Fool's joke against the working class. Indeed, in the last week of March, first the ILO and then ISTAT released two documents that promptly deflate the government's vulgarity.

Let's start with the second, the ISTAT report (Living Conditions and Household Income), which, in essence, says nothing new or sensational, but rather confirms a long-running trend that is gradually affecting millions of working class people who are seeing their living conditions getting worse. The numbers show that in 2024, 13,525 million individuals were at risk of poverty (in addition to the nearly six million who survive in absolute poverty), that is, 23.1% of the population, compared to 22.8% in 2023. They are at risk of social exclusion—as the cold statistical language records banally—since, quite simply, even if they work, they struggle to make ends meet (even when they do so without going into debt), because wages are low, often not even remotely enough to get by week after week, even when they do abide by the clauses of national contracts. The private security contract, signed—it goes without saying—by the unions, is a notorious one, providing for an hourly wage well below the €9 per hour threshold indicated as a viable minimum wage. But even if you work in a sector that offers higher hourly wages, you can be very close to poverty if the job is then trapped in the many forms of legal or illegal precarious work. This kind of noose tightens the necks of millions of workers, predominantly women, young people, and immigrants.

It's no accident that they are the most disadvantaged (i.e., crushed) segments of the working class, a fact that any survey on employment, wherever it comes from, regularly records. In short, employment is the highest since the turn of the century—as the prime minister said, with her usual disdain for ridicule—but these are generally "shit jobs," to use the colloquial term: very low pay, insecure, where the say-so of the bosses knows no limits.

Furthermore, and once again, the "spectacular" increase in employment isn't due to Meloni's miraculous powers, but is part of another international trend, certainly European, that has accelerated for at least a decade. In 2014, unemployment in the Eurozone was 12%, ten years later it was 6.5%, which means, according to the institute that provided the data, 20 million more jobs. So, all good? It depends on how you look at it. From the standpoint of the bosses, both "public" and private, yes, but from that of the working class, certainly less so. In fact, what matters is not the quantity, but the quality of employment, which is generally inversely proportional to the former. The more "aware" bourgeoisie, let's say, or those without electoral interests to protect, note this, also because it's there for all to see: "Europe has moved toward a slightly more American model, where everyone has a job, but a rotten job." This "rotten" employment is characterised by precariousness and low wages, both hourly and monthly, due to the forced reduction in overall working hours:

'Minijobs' in Germany, flexible-hour contracts, workers on home delivery platforms (Deliveroo, Uber Eats, etc.)... Everywhere in the Old Continent, labour market reforms have multiplied, with the aim of simplifying layoffs [the Jobs Act is therefore not an Italian prerogative], reducing support for the unemployed, and easing the obligations of employers.⁽⁴⁾

The Italian labour market and the political pressures that govern it are no exception to this picture. This is to be expected, given that both are the result of the logic of capital and, today, of its decades-long structural crisis. In short, it's the bourgeois application of an old slogan of the labour movement, mostly in a radical-reformist vein: "Less work, work for all." Beyond the bitter aftertaste of the joke, it's not surprising that this forced reduction in hours worked is accompanied by the growing phenomenon of double or even third jobs in Europe—just like in the US— in order to earn a living wage. In short, to reiterate once again, the higher rate of employment is brought about precisely by compressing wages and worsening working conditions, that is, by exacerbating exploitation, all to the detriment of reformist illusions.

Furthermore, there is another important aspect that helps explain the increase in employment, and it is another indicator of the difficulties capital has been struggling with for over half a century. This is the so-called "demographic winter", i.e., the progressive decline in births over the past few decades, alongside the ageing of the population. They are two sides of the same coin, perhaps most pronounced in Italy,⁽⁵⁾ but a phenomenon present in all regions of so-called advanced capitalism.

Amalgamating the "demographic winter" and the falling rate of profit—the root of the difficulties—may seem like an ideological stretch, but upon closer examination, the relationship emerges more clearly. Beyond the undoubted "cultural" changes of recent decades, the declining birth rate is closely linked both to the progressive reduction of social services—the depredation of indirect wages—and to rising job insecurity with the resulting low, if not very low, wages, as noted above. (Although low wages are not a prerogative of the precarious.) Women are especially hit by involuntary part-time work, something which obviously negatively impacts on the possibility of establishing the minimum conditions for "starting a family", as they used to say.

Apart from being self-evident, there are numerous "official" academic studies to demonstrate how the crisis of the accumulation process is an obstacle to the reproduction of the labour force itself.

The long quotation which follows describes the dilemma many couples find themselves in, often even when both are working:

The income of a working couple with a one-year-old child may not be sufficient to cover the costs of housing, food, transport, and daycare. This is called the two-income trap⁽⁶⁾ and is increasingly common [...] for low-income families where both parents are employed, and particularly in the middle bracket, costs have grown faster than overall family income since the late 1970s. In other words, workers' purchasing power has decreased.⁽⁷⁾

In many cases various forms of welfare assistance for families are fundamental but, it goes without saying, they are not enough to counteract the capitalists' decades-long attack on the proletariat, an attack so intense as to cause a collapse in the birth rate. It is precisely the bourgeoisie, agent of capital, that opposes life from this perspective as well. To give another example, it is notorious that entrepreneurs (bosses), before hiring a woman, often intimidate her by asking whether she intends to have children, or have her sign a blank resignation form, so they can fire her without bureaucratic hassles if she becomes pregnant.

Yet even more than the "demographic winter", although real, there is another element that explains the increase in employment in Italy: it is due almost exclusively to the over-fifties and sixties being forced to keep working because the various pension reforms have chained more and more people to the "oar" of the employers' galleys (not least, those of the public sector). To give some numbers: "In February, the number of employed people increased by 47,000 compared to January and reached a new record of 24,332 million, while on an annual basis growth is 2.4%, equal to +567,000 new jobs." But the "567,000 increase in employed people compared to January is due to +542,000 of people over 50 and 52,000 more young people between 15 and 24 years old being employed. The core working age groups are decreasing by 17 thousand employed people (35-49 years) and 10 thousand employed people (25-34 years) respectively. [...] Furthermore [...] on an annual basis, female employment is growing at almost double the rate (+3.1%) of male employment (+1.8%), even if the rate of 54.2% remains approximately 13 points below the European average rate".⁽⁸⁾

The ineffable Minister of Transport, whose mere mention makes us feel sick, has built his dismal political career on the promise of abolishing the worst—but in line with previous—pension reforms. Meanwhile, needless to say, the dismantling of the "Fornero" law⁽⁹⁾ has disappeared without a trace, and indeed, there's a real risk that the retirement age will rise further.

Finally, what about the abolition of the so-called citizens' income, which eliminated income support, however meagre, for 800,000 individuals/family units?

"Conflicting" Statistics do not Erase the Underlying Data

The ILO document on world wages⁽¹⁰⁾ almost seems to have set the table for the ISTAT document, because here too, the wage picture in Italy clashes with the triumphalist grin shamelessly displayed—obviously—by those who today are sitting their honourable behinds on the benches of the majority, even though they have done nothing but pick up the baton from their predecessors.

According to the ILO, between 2008 and 2024, wages in Italy fell by 8.7% (the worst figure), compared, it is said, to a 5% increase in France and 15% in Germany. Specifically, after the sharp decline between 2009 and 2012, following the subprime crisis, wages are shown to have fallen by 3.3% in 2022 and 3.2% in 2023. Only in 2024 an increase of 2.3% was recorded, but it was insufficient to recover the losses of previous years. Therefore, assuming these data are correct, the so-called tax contribution cut (originally initiated by Draghi) hasn't even served to halt the decline in wages, thus revealing itself for what it is: a "little help," yes, but for employers, who avoid spending that (little) money to increase wages. Growth in 2024 cannot be explained by the "cut," but is due to other reasons. The first is that many contracts have been renewed due to their being "affordable", i.e. compatible with profitability—albeit with considerable delay, while over 50% of the workforce (approximately seven million people) are still waiting for renewal. Incidentally, one might almost say that if the government's proposed increase for public sector employees is 6%, it would be better not to bother negotiating: at least it would avoid being held captive by a government that is so concerned for the working class!

The other equally important element, perhaps even more so, is the drop in inflation, which in the two-year period 2022-23 had exceeded 17% (certain data show almost 20%); but in the end, the impact on pay cheques has been more severe, given that the IPCA index on which salary increases are calculated excludes the price of fuel, gas, and electricity, expenses that are far from insignificant, as everyone knows. Therefore, the Italian working class (immigrants included, obviously) seem to have suffered the greatest loss, while in other countries, as already mentioned, wages appear to have actually increased. A golden opportunity for radical reformism to accuse the Italian ruling class—that is, the bourgeoisie and its ravenous, charlatan political personnel—of particular pettiness compared to their foreign counterparts. We certainly don't deny that the attack on wages has been severe, even particularly severe, but we're not entirely convinced by the increase that other segments of the global working class appear to have benefited from. While there undoubtedly exist specificities in different geographical areas, the capitalist system dominates the entire world, as does its decades-long crisis. It is precisely this crisis that forces the "national" branches of the global bourgeoisie to adopt the same strategy toward the proletariat and if in certain parts of the world wages have increased—having started from a very low, if not minimal, levels—in others, particularly in the "centre," they have gone in the opposite direction. In this article, we will not delve into the reasons for this phenomenon and refer to our publications. Here, it is sufficient to recall that, since the late 1970s, the share of wages in global GDP has been steadily declining, while, conversely, that of profits has risen, thus confirming that lower wages are the most immediate and effective factor counteracting the decline in the average rate of profit. Some data confirming this trend are already presented in the Prometeo article cited in the introduction. Here, to confirm that nothing has changed—nor could it—we refer to two graphs⁽¹¹⁾ drawn by an ECB economist (Isabel Schnabel), which show, once again, how the share of wages in GDP is steadily declining, while that of profits follows the opposite trend. Furthermore, the decline in the "wage share" is paralleled by that of "union density," that is, the progressive decline in union membership and strikes. The graph is accompanied by the observation, in some ways correct, that given the union's loss of strength, wages cannot help but decline.

We should add, however, that the crisis of capital, which has pushed the employers to attack the working class head-on has indeed reduced the weight of the unions as a result of the dramatic upheaval and, in the West, dispersal of large concentrations of workers which has changed the composition of the working class. Nevertheless the unions are still a valuable ally for the bosses, as in the past. Indeed, the unions have largely supported the bourgeois offensive, paralysing or limiting a true "worker" response (in the broadest sense), so as not to compromise "social cohesion" — that is, social peace founded on the subjugation of the proletariat and "the country's economy," that is, capital. Thus the "mystery" of the OECD's rising wages statistics from late 2022 remains. At the time "industrial" disputes which are difficult to define as class-based, except with a thousand distinctions, accompanied the crescendo of the employers' and their state's offensive. Bosses as benefactors? For themselves, certainly, and indeed international statistics include executives and managers up to the highest levels among "employees", whose stratospheric "compensation" masks the decline of wages, without which it would appear, as indeed it is, even more to the sole advantage of capital and its officials.

We do need to understand precisely what the methodological criteria for these surveys are, because they risk generating confusion rather than clarity. Let's return to the ILO document, whose language is somewhat perplexing. For example, the introduction states that there is "growth in real wages globally starting in 2022 [but] real wages in many countries have not yet recovered the loss of purchasing power caused by the cost-of-living crisis." Immediately this raises the question: "There may be growth, but what kind of real growth is it if it hasn't recovered what was previously lost?" Banal considerations? Perhaps, but it's like rejoicing at a beautiful funeral.

This isn't the only data that raises some questions, however, as page 14 claims that "With less than 1% of employees classified as low-wage earners, Italy is one of the countries with the least wage inequality." This is a bold statement, given that other academic and, it goes without saying, reformist research provides quite different figures. A digression before continuing: by "low-wage" earners, some research institutes mean "those with an income below 60% of the national median (net of social transfers)"⁽¹²⁾ and according to Eurostat, in Italy this figure is "9%, up from 8.7% recorded in 2023."⁽¹³⁾ For the ILO, however, on page 15, the definition refers to "those earning less than 50% of the median hourly wage." This indication of hourly wages is important because it provides a specific reference, by contrast with surveys that record the increase in the wage share/mass, without specifying whether this is due to an increase in hours worked or numbers employed (even if low-wage and reduced-time). In the latter case, there could be an increase in the wage mass even in the presence of low wages, below the value of the workforce. That said, even the Eurostat data (as well as the ILO) does not seem to agree with another joint study on "Work and Wages in Italy", according to which the percentage of poor workers is higher and, unsurprisingly, has "a strong gender connotation: the percentage of low-wage female workers (19.2%) is almost double that of men (10.5%)."⁽¹⁴⁾ The greater prevalence of low wages among the female workforce—a historic strength of capital, which uses forms of oppression with millennia-old roots to its advantage—adds another piece to the puzzle of employment growth boasted by the prime minister. This growth affects, in percentage terms, men more than women, which brings us back to the "strange" considerations of the ILO report. On page 15, the ILO report correctly identifies the wage disparity affecting women: "Almost 52% of low-wage workers are women. In Italy, female workers represent 43.2% of all employed workers. This proportion rises to 51.9% among low-wage employees." So far, so good (so to speak), but then the document states that "among high-income countries, the overrepresentation of female workers at the lower end of the wage distribution is more modest in Italy than the average for countries in this group, which is estimated at 55.9%." After saying that this "overrepresentation" affects every country in the world (a well-known fact), on page 16 it says: "The gender wage gap in Italy is 9.3%, one of the lowest among European Union countries," where it stands at 14.3%. Now, once again, it is natural to point out the discrepancy with other data (INPS 2022) which show that there is a difference of €7,300 between the average annual salary of men and women (€24,500 against €17,300) that is, approximately 30%, which is obviously reflected in "pension benefits, which are on average 36% lower".⁽¹⁵⁾

Amid this jungle of data, the underlying fact, declared or not, remains that the so-called wage growth, boasted about by various politicians, does not recover what has been lost in the last three or four years. At best, wages—or rather, the proletariat—must chase the cost of living. Most of the time they must fight a rearguard battle that at least tries to limit the damage. According to the OECD, at the end of 2024 wages in Italy were 7.2% lower than in the first four months of 2021; but in the Czech Republic they were at -11.8% and in Sweden at -8.6%.⁽¹⁶⁾ In the same period the Eurozone as a whole recorded -4% and the "average among the 38 countries of the organization registers -0.6%".⁽¹⁷⁾

If Athens cries, Sparta doesn't laugh, and if we include Germany in "Sparta," according to other research institutes, the situation bears little resemblance to the +15% reported by the ILO.

In an article published on his blog on 22 February, economist Michael Roberts describes the state of affairs as follows:

Real wages in Germany remain below pre-pandemic levels. A quarter of Germans have incomes that are insufficient to make ends meet, according to the German Economic Institute … The demise of the German economy has exposed the underlying issue of a 'dual labour' market with a whole layer of part-time temporary employees for German businesses on very low wages. About one-quarter of the German workforce now receive a 'low income' wage, using a common definition of one that is less than two-thirds of the median, which is a higher proportion than in all 17 [maybe 27?, ed.] European countries, except Lithuania.⁽¹⁸⁾

What is there to say, except that it sounds like ISTAT's report from the end of March?

The factor that has worsened the conditions of the proletariat in Italy, Germany, and elsewhere is inflation, magnified by speculation. Now, in addition to this there is a war economy that is aggravating the decades-long attack unleashed by the bosses against wage workers which, as an OECD economist modestly acknowledges, are showing "a responsible attitude in pay demands."⁽¹⁹⁾ In other words: the usual defeatist and complicit policy of trade unionism towards the capitalist system, also known as "the good of the country."

Hoping that the unions will pull the class out of the difficult situation that surfaces from bourgeois studies and, above all, that it experiences daily, is like asking for help from the carter who is taking us to the gallows.

Notes:

(1) leftcom.org

(2) Claudio Tucci, Perché i salari in Italia restano bassi? Inflazione, cuneo fiscale e produttività, Il Sole 24 ore+, 2 maggio 2025.

(3) Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (National Institute of Statistics)

(4) En Europe, le grand chambouement du marché du travail, lemonde.fr

(5) "between 2013 and 2023 ... in the 15-34 age group [...] the total number of young people went from 12.9 to 12 million (-927 thousand) and the number of adults between 35 and 49 years old fell by 2.6 million (from 14.2 to 11.6 million). But in the same period, the number of adults over 50 increased by 1.9 million, from 11.8 to 13.7 million. In this age group, there are more permanent contracts", Giorgio Pogliotti, Lavoro, stanno davvero aumentando i posti stabili in Italia?, Il Sole 24 ore+, 14 March 2025

(6) If both parents work and don't have support from their grandparents, they can't care for the child, so one of them, usually the woman, is forced to quit her job or they have to pay someone else to care for the child. In any case, the family income is significantly reduced..

(7) Marianna Filandri, Lavorare non basta, Laterza, 2022, p. 29. On page 30, she continues by saying that, "In 2020, according to ISTAT, the presence of a minor in the [family] nucleus increased the probability of being in absolute poverty from 7.7 to 11.5%".

(8) Giorgio Pogliotti, Lavoro, l'occupazione in Italia cresce grazie agli over 50: ecco perché, Il Sole 24 ore+, 2 April 2025

(9) The 2012 law, named after Elsa Fornero, then Minister of Labour, shifted workers to a defined contribution scheme, stopped indexing pensions above a certain income level for inflation and increased the retirement age to 67. The aim was to raise cash and reassure markets of the commitment to spending discipline in the eurozone's third-largest economy. All worsened the conditions of workers in relation to capital.

(10) Global Wage Report 2024-25: Is wage inequality decreasing globally?, ilo.org For statistics on Italy, Le tendenze dei salari e delle disuguaglianze salariali in Italia e nel mondo, ilo.org

(11) x.com

(12) Patrizia Pallara, Poveri pur lavorando: lo dice Eurostat, collettiva.it, 28 April 2025.

(13) Pallara, loc. cit.

(14) Rinaldo Evangelista e Lia Pacelli, Lavoro e salari in Italia, in Menabò n. 236, April 2025.

(15) Esmeralda Rizzi, Gender pay gap: una discriminazione che non si ferma, collettiva.it, 15 February 2025.

(16) Giorgio Pogliotti, Stipendi reali, com'è messa l'Italia rispetto agli altri paesi europei?, Il Sole 24 ore+, 27 March 2025

(17) Il Sole 24 ore+, loc cit

(18) thenextrecession.wordpress.com

(19) Il Sole 24 ore+, loc cit.