The repression of the social movement in Bolivia demonstrates the growing offensive of the Latin American bourgeoisie against the working class. Recent elections in Latin America bear witness to this. In Peru, and then in Colombia, two far-right candidates, subservient to Trump and the United States, and proponents of an authoritarian and repressive policy, won the elections against left-wing candidates. The bourgeoisie is no longer satisfied with compromises with the working class to maintain social stability. On the contrary, it is stepping up the class war against the proletariat in order to raise the rate of profit, and in particular against its most exploited segments: immigrants. As this article explains, no hope can be placed in the bourgeois left, whose programme is no different from that of its adversaries. Only the class struggle of the proletariat will put an end to the anti-worker attacks that will multiply throughout Latin America in the coming months.

For over a month, Bolivia was the scene of large-scale protests: blockades of major roads and transport routes, near-daily marches in the streets of La Paz and El Alto, strikes affecting key economic sectors, and violent clashes with police and army forces – with protesters even resorting to the use of dynamite. These movements brought together various sectors of the workforce – including health and education workers, informal sector workers, and miners, as well as impoverished peasants and “cocaleros” (coca growers), who are often of indigenous origin.

These mobilisations, initially driven by wage demands, have succeeded in partially paralysing Bolivia’s economy – an economy already weakened by the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, through which nearly 20% of global oil and gas flows pass. Like the rest of Latin America, Bolivia remains heavily dependent on these supplies to meet its fuel needs. The closure of the strait by Iran quickly led to shortages and price hikes, fuelling a popular discontent that had already been simmering for several years.

The failure of the Bolivian neo-liberal model

Since 2023, Bolivia has been experiencing a severe economic crisis, characterised by the depletion of international foreign exchange reserves, particularly the dollar, high inflation, and growing shortages of essential goods such as fuel. In response, protests erupted against the policies of leftist President Luis Arce, a member of the Movement for Socialism (MAS), the protégé of former union leader and political figure Evo Morales (2006-2019), who has been unable to address the daily struggles of workers, notably refusing to raise wages or limit price increases in the name of maintaining fiscal discipline.⁽¹⁾

This failure of the MAS to cope with the consequences of the economic and social crisis logically led, in the November 2025 elections, to a change of power in favour of Rodrigo Paz, a centre-right Christian Democrat. While his far-right opponent, Jorge Quiroga, former vice-president under dictator Hugo Banzer, promoted a neo-liberal adjustment policy comparable to Milei’s programme in Argentina, Rodrigo Paz during his campaign advocated for a “capitalism for all” that would preserve some of the so-called “gains” of the Morales era while implementing “progressive” and “moderate” neo-liberal reforms. Once in power, however, he implemented the exact same policies as his opponent. His government – backed by a broad political spectrum ranging from the social-democratic centre-left to the xenophobic far-right – drastically cut social spending by approximately 30% and reduced fuel subsidies in an effort to curb inflation through “shock therapy”. At the same time, he abolished four taxes to “encourage private investment”; the tax on large fortunes, the financial transaction tax, the gambling tax, and the tax on corporate promotional activities.⁽²⁾ He had promised to lift Bolivia out of its economic slump. Instead, the crisis in Bolivia intensified due to the economic fallout from the war in the Middle East; inflation hit record highs, while workers faced steadily declining incomes, constantly eroded by the rising cost of living. Initial protests had already taken place earlier in the year when the new centre-right President sought to implement Supreme Decree 5503, which eliminated fuel subsidies.⁽³⁾

But these mobilisations intensified as the living conditions of the proletariat and semi-proletariat deteriorated sharply under the repercussions of the international crisis. Triggered by the May Day demonstrations demanding a 20% wage increase, to which the government responded by deploying troops, they were initially focused on improving immediate material conditions. They quickly broadened to include a range of economic demands: defence of agrarian reform⁽⁴⁾, opposition to budget cuts in social programs and public services, opposition to reductions in fuel subsidies, and rejection of privatisations. Gradually, these demands took on a political dimension. It was no longer simply a matter of fighting the social consequences of neo-liberal policies, but of demanding the resignation of the government and President Rodrigo Paz, accused of being responsible for the dire economic situation. They rapidly intensified in the country's main cities (Oruro, Cochabamba, La Paz, El Alto, Potosí), bringing together ever-increasing numbers of workers and peasants, who were demanding the President’s resignation by any means necessary, including the use of direct action.⁽⁵⁾ While some – notably Trotskyists – view this demand as a sign of the protesters’ growing political consciousness, it actually illustrates the persistence of bourgeois-democratic mystification within the ranks of the proletariat. Regardless of whether the government is right-wing or left-wing, the same anti-worker policies – subservient to capital – will be implemented. The economic and social crisis in Bolivia cannot be explained solely by the international crisis or the current president’s neo-liberal policies. It is the direct consequence of the economic choices made by his predecessors, who pursued the development of a rent-based capitalist model.

Economic "miracle" or mirage? The failure of pseudo-communitarian “socialism”

In reality, this economic deterioration is primarily due to the continued pursuit of a rent-based, mono-export model centred on dependence on fossil fuels and raw materials. Bolivia, rich in subsoil resources – particularly gas – has long funded its social welfare system using oil and gas revenues, for instance by providing substantial fuel subsidies financed by the foreign currency earnings generated by these resources.

Initially, this development model led to a significant improvement in Bolivia’s economic and social situation – with some even speaking of an economic "miracle": a drop in extreme poverty, sustained economic growth, increased foreign currency reserves, reduced deficits and debt, and a decline in both unemployment and informal employment.⁽⁶⁾ This outcome was by no means the result of any "communitarian socialism" espoused by the MAS. We communists know that miracles are for the gullible who wish to believe in them. This development model was sustainable only as long as there was sufficient foreign currency to maintain it and stabilise the economy. However, given that state budget revenues relied exclusively on oil and gas resources – and that these were gradually depleted to fund fuel subsidies – these revenue streams quickly dried up, fuelling inflation.⁽⁷⁾

One experiment followed another, and with them, the same failures. The entire “socialist” project championed by the Latin American left relies on the exploitation of natural resources to fund redistribution and social programs. This model has reinforced dependence on raw materials – commodities with inherently volatile prices that fluctuate according to global demand. Consequently, whenever a crisis strikes, it is always the workers who bear the brunt of the consequences. “Masismo” is no exception to this rule. Upon taking office in 2006, Evo Morales announced that he would follow IMF recommendations, implement a policy of fiscal discipline, and negotiate with foreign companies to allow them to continue exploiting Bolivia’s subsoil resources.⁽⁸⁾ No significant agrarian reform took place; meanwhile, the government pursued a policy of “wage restraint”, and social reforms remained extremely modest and limited.⁽⁹⁾ Illustrating this lack of a clean break from the neo-liberal model, clashes frequently erupted throughout his presidency between a militant segment of the working class – opposed to the alignment of the main trade union confederation, the COB (Bolivian Workers' Centre), with the MAS government – and the police; these confrontations were often marked by fierce repression, while the union confederation consistently acted as a strikebreaker, hand in glove with the government. Indeed, Vice President Álvaro García Linera had dispelled any ambiguity regarding the MAS's true orientation as early as the 2005 election campaign:

I [we] would place ourselves on the centre-left, because the project of economic and social transformation that this organisation wishes to carry out cannot be described as communist, socialist, or even 'communitarian' (...) [We want to build] a sort of Andean capitalism.⁽¹⁰⁾

The admission is crystal clear. Despite revolutionary rhetoric and constant references to “socialism”, the MAS’s project never aimed to abolish capitalist exploitation, but rather to manage it differently. The so-called “process of change” amounted in reality to a modernisation of Bolivian capitalism, legitimised by an anti-imperialist discourse perfectly compatible with the perpetuation of wage slavery and capital accumulation.

The hope that working class sectors have placed in the bourgeois left is not a new phenomenon. In 2003, protests erupted when the Bolivian government planned to export natural gas abroad for the exclusive benefit of multi-national corporations. These protests led to the resignation of President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, who was forced to flee the country due to a workers' uprising demanding the nationalisation of gas and the expropriation of foreign companies. Amidst a near-insurrectionary climate, the MAS – the main opposition party – struck a deal with interim President Carlos Mesa to avert his resignation and restore normality, in exchange for vague promises that the interim government naturally failed to keep. Evo Morales succeeded in channelling this anger into the institutional arena, enabling him to win the 2005 general election.

Yet another betrayal by trade unionism and the "left of capital"

The MAS is, of course, not the only organisation to systematically betray the trust placed in it by the working class and the semi-proletariat. The Bolivian left and trade union movement has been characterised by a long history of betrayals of the workers' movement.

In 1952, during the so-called "Bolivian National Revolution," the COB – then largely dominated by the Revolutionary Workers' Party (POR, a Trotskyist group led by Juan Lechín and Guillermo Lora) – allied itself with the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR, representing the nationalist left-wing bourgeoisie) to overthrow the old agrarian oligarchy and establish a form of “popular” capitalism, promising better representation for workers and peasants alongside more “dignified” social policies. Ultimately, the agrarian reform failed to alter the traditional oligarchic structure – despite this being the primary demand of the impoverished peasantry – while miners' strikes were harshly suppressed by the new “revolutionary” government, which continued to enjoy the support of the COB and the POR.

Today, the COB maintains this long legacy of class collaboration. Fearing that dissent might escalate into an uncontrollable social uprising, the organisation sought to break the movement's momentum, opposing the implementation of a general strike that its own rank-and-file had actually approved. To put an end to the stalling movement, it signed an agreement with the government on June 19, halting strikes and blockades in exchange for a pledge not to privatise several state-owned enterprises and the establishment of “social conferences” aimed at fostering “social dialogue”.⁽¹¹⁾ This decision was viewed by various grassroots sectors as a “betrayal” and a “capitulation” to the government.⁽¹²⁾

The extreme left wing of capital was, of course, not to be outdone. While the Bolivian Communist Party supported the MAS – as do certain Trotskyist organizations like the POR and various Maoist groups – others claim to offer a more direct critique of “communitarian socialism” viewing it as subservient to “big capital”. Yet their programme boils down to a vague plea for the COB to radicalise its actions in order to “force” the resignation of President Rodrigo Paz and call for a new constituent assembly. Such is the wretchedness of inter-classism and democratism! They are incapable of grasping the meaning of the proletariat’s autonomous organization, having always served as appendages to the bourgeois left – its most zealous supporters. Their programme can only be this: everything within the COB, nothing against the COB, nothing outside the COB. Ours is the programme of social revolution and the abolition of the wage system – the overthrow of bourgeois power, whether pro-American or ostensibly “anti-imperialist”.

The need for an autonomous and independent organisation of the proletariat

As we write this, the movement has largely lost steam. At the height of the protests, Bolivia’s economy was completely paralysed, with nearly a hundred recorded roadblocks. Today, only about ten remain. Following the agreement reached between the government and the COB, only a small fraction of the protesters continue to oppose the deal and demand the government's resignation. The government has declared a state of emergency, deploying the army to clear the remaining roadblocks and crack down on the last pockets of dissent. What better illustration of the division of labour between the unions and the government? For the union’s part: they abandoned the workers in the midst of their struggle, thereby disillusioning the majority of participants, whilst the government: violently repressed the remaining fighters, now isolated from the rest of the class.⁽¹⁴⁾ It is a clear defeat, yet it is equally clear that Bolivian workers will continue the struggle in the months and years to come. No collaborationist agreement of capitulation will put an end to the class struggle or to the deterioration of the proletariat's living and working conditions.

The Bolivian proletariat has historically demonstrated its strength – as the massive strikes of 1984–1985 against President Víctor Paz Estenssoro’s neo-liberal decrees and the "Gas War" of 2003–2005 showed. Yet, identifying and fighting an enemy is not enough. While the Bolivian proletariat is aware of the antagonism between itself and international capital – along with the latter’s lackeys – it has not yet realised that its so-called allies actually serve those same interests. Their goal is to channel dissent and divert it to serve their own political agendas. Trade unions, acting as true transmission belts for capital, seek above all to defuse social anger in order to save a government in crisis and continue negotiating the price of labour power, remaining faithful to their role as the bourgeoisie’s watchdogs. For his part, Evo Morales is exploiting popular discontent in his relentless pursuit of power, mobilising the poorest and most marginalised sectors of the population – groups fuelled by nostalgia for his term in office and a more favourable economic climate. In both instances, the aim is not so much to address the aspirations of the exploited as to mobilise them as auxiliary forces in the struggle to seize or preserve the bourgeois state apparatus.

History shows us that these organisations have never truly fought for the living and working conditions of the proletariat, much less for its emancipation. On the contrary, they have always stood as the primary obstacle on that path. They will always prioritise the defence of capital – whether national or international – at the expense of the working class, because any autonomous action by the proletariat directly threatens their interests: namely, the stability and preservation of the capitalist mode of production.

The deadly, deceptive trap facing the Bolivian proletariat today is the belief that their situation would improve if the centre-right president were to resign and withdraw his reviled decrees. The reality is that he is merely implementing the policies required by the bourgeoisie – just as Evo Morales and his successor, Luis Arce, did in their time. Who could forget that it was Morales himself who, in 2010, sought to cut fuel subsidies to appease financial markets, credit rating agencies, and international organisations? A change of government will not alter policy toward the working class, which is fundamentally constrained by the logic inherent in the international capitalist system.

By realising that those who present themselves as allies are actually false friends – ready to deceive at every turn – the proletariat must fight based on its own programme, maintaining complete autonomy and independence from the various bourgeois factions, whether left or right. The task of revolutionary communist militants is to foster this political awareness and to organise inside the proletariat for the struggles ahead. Without an international communist organisation, the proletariat cannot act as a class conscious of its own interests, strengths, historical programme, and methods of struggle – the very elements that once enabled it, in the words of Karl Marx, to “storm the heavens”.

Notes:

Image: Wawitasny7 (CC BY-SA 4.0), commons.wikimedia.org

(1) infobae.com ; infobae.com and elpais.com

(2) elpais.com

(3) elpais.com and infobae.com

(4) The demonstrations were mainly against Law 1720 which allowed a greater concentration of land by a small handful of landowners.

(5) izquierdaweb.com and rtve.es

(6) courrierinternational.com

(7) courrierinternational.com

(8) See especially, From Rebellion to Reform in Bolivia: Class Struggle, Indigenous Liberation, and the Politics of Evo Morales, Jeffery R. Webber, Haymarket Books, 2011.

(9) monde-diplomatique.fr Jeffery R. Webber, loc.cit

(10) internationalviewpoint.org

(11) reuters.com

(12) eldeber.com.bo

(13) lemonde.fr

(14) rfi.fr